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AFTER ABU GHRAIB: DOES THE MCCAIN AMENDMENT, AS PART
OF THE 2006 DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, CLARIFY U.S.
INTERROGATION POLICY OR TIE THE HANDS OF U.S.
INTERROGATORS?
Luke M. Meriwether*
I. INTRODUCTION
Torture is repulsive. It is deliberate cruelty, a crude and ancient tool of
political oppression.

It is commonly used...

to wring confessions out of

suspected criminals who may or may not be guilty. It is the classic shortcutfor a
lazy or incompetent investigator.... But professional terroristspose a harder
question. They are lockboxes containingpotentially life-saving information.'
Mark Bowden

The use of torture, defined as "[t]he infliction of intense pain to the• body
,,2 or

mind to punish, to extract a confession.., or to obtain sadistic pleasure, is
abhorred and readily condemned by civilized people across the world. 3 The
. J.D. Candidate May 2007, The University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma; B.B.A.,
Business Administration, The University of Tulsa, December 2003. I would like to thank my
entire family for all of their support and encouragement over the past few years. Specifically, I
would like to dedicate this comment to my parents, Ron and Eileen Meriwether, for reminding me
that success is not possible without hard work. Without your sacrifices, my success would not be
possible. I would also like to thank the ILJ editorial board and staff for all of their hard work and
dedication in making this publication possible.
1. Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, 292 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 51, 53
(October 2003).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1528 (8th ed. 2004).
3. Bowden, supra note 1,at 53.
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international community has consistently taken the position and has sought to
protect "those rights [that] derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person." 4 The United States has publicly accepted those principles and echoed
the purpose of the U.N. Convention Against Torture, which is "to make more
effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment throughout the world."5 However, many allegations
throughout the United States' "War on Terror" have publicly questioned the
United States' interrogation tactics, as well as the methodology and conditions of
confinement imposed on detainees held by the United States in Afghanistan,
Guantanamo Bay, Iraq,6 and other places around the world. 7 These allegations
have created an ongoing firestorm of controversy and debate, with one side
opposed to any change in the current laws and processes, while the other side is
calling for changes that are significant enough "to alter our current legal
system's focus from punishing completed crimes to a more aggressive approach
capable of preventing [any future] terrorist attack.,' 8 The pivotal concern in
every discussion on the topic is striking a balance "between protecting civil
liberties 9 and providing adequate safety to the nation from the threat of
terrorism". ' The recently adopted McCain Amendment, as part of the 2006
Defense Appropriations Act,1 was designed to clarify some of the ambiguities
surrounding the authorized techniques of interrogation, the line that is drawn
between interrogation and torture, and the constitutional protections afforded
to
12
those held in the custody or effective control of the U.S. at home or abroad.

4. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June
26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
5. Id.
6. Gretchen Borchelt, Break Them Down: Systematic Use of Psychological Torture by US
forces,
2005
PHYSICIANS
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS
1,
available
at

http://www.phrusa.org/research/torture/pdf/pysch-torture.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2006)
[hereinafter PHR Report].
7. See generally Bowden, supra note 1, at 54 (reporting that "[s]cores of other detainees,
considered leaders, have been or are being held at various locations around the world: in Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand,
and Iraq").
8. Jeffrey F. Addicott, Into the Star Chamber.- Does the United States Engage in the Use of
Torture or Similar Illegal Practices in the War on Terror? 92 KY. L.J. 849, 850 (2003-2004).

9. Black's defines civil liberty as "[f]reedom from undue governmental interference or
restraint." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (8th ed. 2004).

10. Addicott, supra note 8, at 850.
11. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680
(2005).
12. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §1001, 119 Stat. 2739-40 (2005).
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This comment explores whether the McCain Amendment, which is part of
the 2006 Defense Appropriations Act, clarifies the United States' interrogation
policy, by specifically explaining which techniques are permitted and which are
prohibited, or restricts United States interrogators from gathering necessary
information that could thwart a major terrorist attack. Section II of this comment
explores the specific allegations of torture made against the United States
alongside the backdrop of international law. Section III highlights the United
States' response to these allegations, specifically breaking down the language of
the recent McCain Amendment and exploring its practical application. Section
V discusses the ongoing problems that military personnel and law enforcement
are faced with at home and abroad, mainly the complex nature of the "ticking
time bomb"' 13 scenario and the legal protections and defenses afforded to an
individual forced to make a choice between two evils. 14 Finally, Section V
concludes with the author's assessment of how to balance civil liberties and
national security demands within the "War on Terror" and the hypocritical
nature of a strict ban on all forms of torture and aggressive interrogation
techniques.
11. ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
"The War on Terrorism cannot be won without timely, reliable, and
abundant intelligence. That intelligence cannot be obtained without
robust interrogationefforts. 15
Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, Directorof the Defense IntelligenceAgency
13. See discussion infra Section IV. A "ticking time bomb" scenario involves the threat of
imminent attack on U.S. interests at home or abroad. Such scenario would develop when a
terrorist is taken into custody by U.S. officials who have sound reasons to believe that the suspect
possesses specific knowledge of an imminent terrorist attack: for instance, a plot similar to 9/11 or
a bomb placed on a New York City subway.
14. Addicott, supra note 8, at 899. Making a choice between two evils has often been referred
to as a Hobson's choice. The Hobson's choice that U.S. interrogators would be faced with in a
"ticking time bomb" scenario poses one of the strongest arguments in modem times for the use of
non-lethal torture.
15. Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby (USN), Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency at 6, Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4445), available
at http://www.state.de.us/cjc/PDF/Jacoby%20declaration.pdf [hereinafter Jacoby Declaration]
(mentioning that Lowell E. Jacoby is "a Vice Admiral in the United States Navy with more than 30
years of active federal commissioned service." From July 2002 to November 2005, Vice Admiral
Jacoby served as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) where he reported to the
Secretary of Defense. DIA "is a [Department of Defense] combat support agency with over 7,000
military and civilian employees worldwide," and its "activities include collection of information
needed by the President and Vice President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State
and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials." Id. at 2.).
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In 1945, after the atrocities of World War II were made public, the United
Nations was formed seeking the protection of human rights around the world
through the facilitation of agreements between member countries and
international declarations. 16
After a series of subsequent international
declarations, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 17 the
primary international agreement governing torture and ill-treatment was passed
in 1985: the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention). 18 The
Torture Convention's stated purpose is "to promote universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms,"' 19 and to define and
protect those who are subject to "torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment throughout the world." The Torture Convention, to
which the United States is a party, defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him... information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he... has committed or is suspected of having
committed... when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or...
with the consent.., 2 1of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity.
When a person engages in acts of torture, he or she is not subject to
international law to the degree that a state official acting in his or her official
capacity would be. 22 Under international law, only state actors can be found

16. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapterl.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12,
1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) (In the
Declaration's Preamble, it is stated that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world").
18. Torture Convention, supra note 4 (Adopted in 1984, this Convention serves as the primary
international agreement governing torture and ill-treatment around the world).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at art. 1, para. 1.
22. See State v. Anderson, 484 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. 1997). The case details a particularly
gruesome murder in which the defendant, along with other individuals, tortured a victim. The
Court deemed the torture as the proximate cause of the victim's death. To support jury charge for
first-degree murder by torture, the Court had to review the evidence: the defendant had participated
in torturing the victim in trailer by beating the victim, using soldering iron on the victim's arm,
using an aerosol torch on the victim's genital area and carving derogatory term into the victim's
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guilty of torture. 23 Article 16 of the Torture Convention further obliges states
"to prevent.., other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which do not
amount to torture as defined in Article ,1,4 which has come to be known as "ill' 25
treatment."
The Torture Convention is a strict ban on torture and contains a clear "no
exceptions clause" under Article 2, which states that "[n]o exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture. ' 26 Additionally, Article 3 of the Torture Convention
prohibits any state from "expel[ling], return[ing] ...or extradit[ing] a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be
in danger of being subjected to torture. ' 27 In making this determination, the
state is responsible for taking into account all relevant considerations, which
includes whether the State where the person is being transferred has shown "a
' 28
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights."
In light of clear and universally recognized legal prohibitions on torture,
"[i]nternational estimates suggest that governments use torture or other illtreatment in more than sixty countries or territories worldwide."
Innovative
cruelty and torture are still commonplace in areas of Central and South America,
the Middle East, and Africa. Some governments allow rape and mutilation as a
means of extorting confessions or information from prisoners in captivity. 3 1 In
countries that practice "Sharia, ' 32 such as Somalia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria,
Sudan, and others, maiming and physical abuse are legal; thieves that are caught
by the authorities could have their hands chopped off and "women convicted of
adultery may be stoned to death." 33 These state-endorsed activities clearly fall
arm. The defendant and others living in trailer had discussed possible ways to kill the victim.
Moreover, the torture had continued after defendant left trailer until the victim ultimately died in a
closet. Id.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See generally Torture Convention, supra note 4.
Id. at art. 16, para. 1.
Addicott, supra note 8, at 857.
Torture Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 2.
Id. at art. 3, para. 1.
Id. at art. 3, para. 2.
Catherine M. Grosso, International Law in the Domestic Arena: The Case of Torture in

Israel, 86 IowA L. REv. 305, 308 (2000).
30. See generally Bowden, supra note 1, at 53.
31. Id.

32. Sharia is defined as "the code of law based on the Koran." It is also "derived... from the
teachings and example of Mohammed; Sharia is only applicable to Muslims." Moreover, "under
Islamic law there is no separation of church and state."

WordNet, Sharia, available at

http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=sharia (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
33. Bowden, supra note 1, at 53.
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within the precise definition of torture and civilized societies around the world,
including the United States, find this behavior repulsive and readily condemn
it. 34 However, many groups around the world campaigning against all forms of
torture fear that there are other forms or methods of torture being employed by
on Terror," and that the rules forbidding such
the United States in the "War
35
methods are being ignored.
These other methods, some people argue, fall short of torture and have
come to be known as "torture lite." Some of the various methods employed as
torture lite include sleep deprivation, exposure to extreme hot or cold, placing a
smelly hood over the head of a prisoner, forcing a prisoner to stand or squat for
hours, 37 and "playing on his fears for himself and his family. ' 3 8 These types of
"enhanced" interrogation techniques are less violent, but remain coercive and
tactics
sometimes effective. 39 "Although excruciating for the victim, these
40
generally leave no permanent marks and do no lasting physical harm."
Since September 11, 2001, imminent fear of another terrorist attack has led
United States military personnel to use more aggressive forms of interrogation in
In testimony before the Senate
the "War on Terror," specifically "torture lite.'
Select Committee on Intelligence on September 26, 2002, former C.I.A. Chief of
the Counterterrorist Center Cofer Black said, "All I want to say is that there was
'before' 9/11 and 'after' 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves came off."' 42 A Newsweek
article in November of 2005 reported that "[a]t one point, the Bush
administration formally told the CIA it couldn't be prosecuted for any technique
43
short of inflicting the kind of pain that accompanies 'organ failure' or 'death'.'
The success of implementing these tactics has produced mixed results. 44 On
some occasions, it has led to the successful prevention of possible terrorist
attacks.4 5 British intelligence used some torture lite tactics to uncover the

34. Id. at 52-53.
35. Id. at 475-47.
36. Evan Thomas & Michael Hirsh, The Debate Over Torture, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 2005, at
27, 28.
37. id. at 27-28.
38. Bowden, supra note 1, at 53.
39. Thomas, supra note 36, at 28.
40. Bowden, supra note 1, at 53.
41. See generally Thomas, supra note 36, at 28.
42. Joint Investigation: Before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
109th Cong. (2002) (Statement of Cofer Black, Former Chief of the Counterterrorist Center,
Central Intelligence Agency).
43. Thomas, supra note 36, at 28.
44. See id. at 28.
45. Id.
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command structure of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 4 6 On more than one
occasion, Israel successfully employed these tactics to stop Palestinian suicide
bombers from striking. 47 A second wave of attacks by al Qaeda against targets
on the West Coast of the United States was supposedly prevented because of the
enhanced interrogation techniques used on Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, 4 8 the
mastermind of September 11 th.4 9 In other situations, the use of these techniques
has produced futile and often false information. Often, prisoners that are
exposed to prolonged pain or other torture lite techniques will say anything, true
or false, to make the pain stop. 50 The most appropriate illustration of this point
is through the experiences of Senator John McCain, a Prisoner Of War during
Vietnam who was exposed to horrific acts of torture, who said:
In my experience, abuse of prisoners often produces bad
intelligence because under torture a person will say anything he
thinks his captors want to hear-whether it is true or false-if he
believes it will relieve his suffering. I was once physically
coerced to provide my enemies with the names of the members
of my flight squadron, information that had little if any value to
my enemies as actionable intelligence. But I did not refuse, or
repeat my insistence that I was required under the Geneva
Conventions to provide my captors only with my name, rank and
serial number. Instead, I gave them the names of the Green Bay
Packers' offensive line, knowing that providing
them false
51
information was sufficient to suspend the abuse.
In 2004 "[t]he infamous pictures from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq indelibly
brought home how '52 certain torture tactics, primarily methods of torture lite,
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See generally Bowden, supra note 1, at 51-53 (Khalid Shaikh Mohammed ("KSM") "is

considered the architect of the two attempts on the World Trade Center: the one that failed, in
1993, and the one that succeeded [on September 11, 2001].

He is also believed to have been

behind the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and on the USS Cole [in
2000], and behind [the execution] of The Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl ...." He is

also a close associate of Osama bin Laden and has been called the operations chief of al-Qaeda.
Additionally, he is considered by many to be one of the biggest catches in the United States' "War
on Terror" for his far reaching knowledge of the inner-workings of the al-Qaeda terrorist
network.).
49. Thomas, supra note 36, at 28.
50. See Bowden, supra note 1,at 53.
51. Sen. John McCain, Torture's Terrible Toll, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 2005, at 34 [hereinafter
McCain].
52. PHR Report, supra note 6, at 1.
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were being used by the United States military forces and may continue today in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo and other places around the world. 53 The
allegations have ranged from prolonged isolation and sleep deprivation to
cultural and sexual humiliation of detainees. 54 Since Abu Ghraib, eleven
separate investigations have been conducted by 55the Pentagon into alleged
misconduct and prisoner abuse by military officials.
One common technique in all three areas of operation (Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Guantanamo Bay) throughout the "War on Terror" has been prolonged
isolation. 5 6 The use of isolation forms a large part of the housing system at
Guantanamo. 57 Some reports have said that "detainees at Guantanamo [are]
being kept in isolation for anywhere from... three months to [eighteen]
months."' 8
Additionally, in its February 2004 report, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that detainees at the Baghdad
International Airport were being "held for nearly [twenty-three] hours a day in
strict solitary confinement in small concrete cells devoid of daylight." 59 The
devastating effects associated with prolonged isolation "include depression...
difficulty with concentration and memory... hallucinations and perceptual
distortions, [and] paranoia." 60 "In November 2002, FBI agents at Guantanamo
Bay observed a detainee after he had been subjected to intense isolation in a cell
that was continually flooded with light for over three months." "They reported
that the detainee was 'evidencing behavior consistent with extreme
psychological trauma (talking to non-existent people, reporting hearing6 1voices,
crouching in a corner of the cell covered with a sheet for hours on end)."'
Another common interrogation tactic employed by United States military
personnel is sleep deprivation, which ranges in degree and method, but often

53. See Bowden, supra note 1, at 54 (reporting that "[sicores of other detainees, considered
leaders, have been or are being held at various locations around the world: in Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Iraq.").
54. See generally PHR Report, supra note 6, at 1-7.

55. Thomas, supra note 36, at 31.
56. PHR Report, supra note 6, at 3.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], Report of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other
Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation,
at para. 43 (Feb. 2004).
60. PHR Report, supra note 6, at 10.
61. Id. (quoting the letter from T.J. Harrington, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Major General Donald J. Ryder, Department of the
Army (July 14, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_4622_4624.pdf.

(last visited Dec. 15, 2006)).
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involves waking the detainees every fifteen minutes, continually playing loud
music, and keeping bright lights on at all times. 62 Military personnel, in
describing how sleep deprivation was employed at the naval base in
Guantanamo, reported:
[A]n inmate was awakened, subjected to an interrogation...
then returned to a different cell. As soon as the guards
determined the inmate had fallen into a deep sleep, he was
awakened again for interrogation after which he would be
returned to yet a different
cell. This could happen five or six
63
times during a night.
By most accounts, sleep deprivation produces nothing more than
disorientation and confusion. 64 "During the Spanish Inquisition 500 years ago,
priests" tried to get infidels to talk by using sleep deprivation, but found that it
only induced hallucinations in the prisoners. 65 "[D]uring the Korean War, [after]
36 of 59 captured U.S. airmen confessed to war crimes" they did not commit,
many in the United States feared that the Communists had developed a
horrifying new method of torture or brainwashing to extract these false
confessions. 66 After subsequent investigation, the United States learned that the
tactic employed was actually prolonged, chronic sleep deprivation. 67 The health
consequences associated with long periods of sleep deprivation "include
[cognitive] 'impairment[] in memory, learning... verbal processing, and
' 6 8 as well as speech
decision-making,
impairments and loss of short-term
69
memory.
Richard Schwab, a medical director for the University of
Pennsylvania's Center for Sleep Disorders, has reported that "[a]fter one night of
lost sleep, people's judgment is impaired, their reactions slow, they have trouble

62. See id. at 4-5.
63. Neil A. Lewis, Broad Use of Harsh Tactics Is Described at Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.

17, 2004, at Al.
64. See generally PHR Report, supra note 6, at 11.

65. Thomas, supra note 36, at 27.
66. April Witt, In Pr. George's Homicides, No Rest for the Supects, WASH. POST, June 4, 2001,
at Al.

67. Id.
68. PHR Report, supra note 6, at 11 (referencing to NOLEN-HOEKSEMA S., ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY 627 (McGraw-Hill 2d ed. 2005)).

69. Id. (referencing to 1 KAPLAN AND SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK
289 (B Sadock & V Sadock eds., Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 8th ed. 2005)).
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making decisions and they are prone to mistakes ....70After two nights...

people can become temporarily psychotic and hallucinate."
Other common interrogation techniques employed in Afghanistan,
Guantanamo Bay, and Iraq include sexual and cultural humiliations, as well as
physical abuses and the strategic use of detainees' phobias against them. 7 1 The
use of humiliation is a way to break down a detainee's resistance. 72 These
methods include forced nudity and grooming, using dogs during interrogations to
incite fear, and using female interrogators,7 3 which would "violat[e] Muslim
taboos regarding sex and contact with women.... "74 During late 2002, an FBI
Special agent reported that he had observed a female United States military
officer conducting an interrogation on a detainee at Guantanamo Bay who "was
shackled and [had] his hands... cuffed to his waist."'75
During this
interrogation, through the surveillance camera, the agent observed the female
interrogator "whispering in the detainee's ear, and caressing and applying lotion
to his arms (this was during Ramadan when physical contact
with a woman
76
would have been particularly offensive to a Moslem male)."
Perhaps the most appalling behavior by United States military forces
occurred at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, where "Maj[or] Gen[eral] Antonio
Taguba confirmed in April 2004 that abuses by military police guards...
included punching, slapping and kicking detainees; forcing naked male detainees
to wear women's underwear; forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate...
[and] letting a dog bite and severely injure a detainee .... ."77 The Physicians for
Human Rights Report indicates that the behavior of military personnel at Abu
Ghraib and the extreme forms of sexual humiliation shown in the photographs
were not routine. 7 8 In fact, two former Pakistani prisoners at Guantanamo Bay
told a reporter that they were not mistreated at all, except for some rough
treatment immediately following their capture. 7 9 The two prisoners said, "[t]hey
both felt bored, lonely, frustrated, angry, and helpless. .. but neither believed

70. Witt, supra note 66, at Al ("Richard Swab... [also] said depriving people of sleep during
prolonged interrogation and questioning can help extract confessions, even from the innocent.").
71. See generally Thomas, supra note 36, at 31.
72. PHR Report, supra note 6, at 5.
73. See PHR Report, supra note 6, at 5-7.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Letter from T.J. Harrington, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, to Major General Donald J.Ryder, Department of the Army I (July 14,
2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_4622_4624.pdf. (last visited Oct.
12, 2006).
76. Id.
77. Thomas, supra note 36, at 31.
78. PHR Report, supra note 6, at 6.
79. Bowden, supra note 1,at 74.
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that he would be harmed by [their] American captors .... 80 However, a
Southern Command report in early 2005 indicated that at least one detainee at
Guantanamo Bay "was forced to perform dog tricks on a leash, was straddled by
a female interrogator, told that his mother and sister were whores, forced to wear
a woman's bra and thong on his head during
interrogation... and [was]
81
subjected to an unmuzzled dog to scare him."
Many argue that the prisoner abuses were a direct result of the faulty
implementation of "strategic interrogation" methods authorized by the Bush
Administration. 82 The techniques were poorly implemented and inadequately
supervised, which resulted in unfortunate, untrained United States soldiers
wanting to follow orders, but not knowing for sure what those orders were.83
The case of Private Lynndie England, the female Army MP at Abu Ghraib who
was shown in many of the now infamous pictures participating in the abuse of
prisoners, demonstrates this confusion. 84 England was court-martialed and
maintained throughout her ordeal that she was simply acting under orders from
her superior officers. 85 She stated that she and other soldiers were ordered to
"soften up" certain prisoners and make them weak for interrogation before other
governmental agencies, like the CIA, could step in to conduct the actual
interrogation.
The government has continually reiterated that the abuse of
prisoners at United States detention facilities, such as Abu Ghraib, is nothing
more than "the act of a few bad apples. ' 87 However, there is stronger evidence
that "the Bush administration made understandable decisions to permit the use of
harsh interrogation techniques against a few individuals. [These] decisions were
made in such an atmosphere of secrecy and confusion that the whole process
spun out of control and produced atrocities" for the whole world to see. 8 Not
only are these photos a source of embarrassment, but they could actually work
against the United States' national security. 89 The United States' enemies could
80. Id.

81. Thomas, supra note 36, at 31.
82. See id. at 32-33.

83. Id. at 32.
84. Tony Gutierrez, Lynndie England Convicted in Abu Ghraib Trial, USA TODAY, Sept. 25,

2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-26-england-x.htm (last visited
Dec. 15, 2006) (Discussing the September 2005 sentencing of Lynndie England who "was
convicted.., by a military judge on six of seven counts." England was also in one of the more
famous pictures from the Abu Ghraib scandal, where she was pictured holding a naked inmate
from a leash).
85. The

Pictures:

Lynndie

England,

CBS

NEWS,

May

12,

2004,

available at

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/12/60IImain617121.shtml (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Thomas, supra note 36, at 29.
89. H.R. REP. No. 109-374, at 5 (2006).
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use these photos as a recruiting tool for generating
more hatred and animosity
90
towards our country and our troops abroad.
In February 2006, a report by five U.N. officials called for the closing of the
Guantanamo Bay detention center, and stated that "U.S. treatment of detainees in
some cases amounted to torture.. . . 91 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
echoed the suggestions of the report and said that "the U.S. should close the
prison 'as soon as possible."' 92 The report, which was "based on an [eighteen]month investigation by five U.N. officials," 93 cites specific concerns with the
U.S. treatment of hunger strikers. 94 Detainees, through their lawyers, "said long
nasal tubes were brutally95inserted and removed twice a day, causing intense pain,
bleeding and vomiting."
The United States quickly dismissed the report, "calling it a 'rehash' of old
allegations," and stating that detainees "were force-fed only to save their
lives. ' 96 The United States cited specific concerns that the conclusions drawn by
the U.N officials were based on interviews with family members of detainees
and former detainees. 97 White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan stated
that the "terrorists that are being kept at Guantanamo Bay... are trained to
provide false information, and al Qaeda training manuals talk about ways to
disseminate false information. . . ." 98 The five-member team canceled a visit to
Guantanamo Bayin November 2005 after the United States denied them access
to the prisoners.
The reason U.N. officials were denied access to detainees is
that the "International Committee of the Red Cross is the only independent
organization allowed to visit detainees at Guantanamo and U.S.1 military bases in
Afghanistan and Iraq, under a strict confidentiality agreement." 00
Today, this shroud of secrecy and restricted access has produced many
questions regarding the treatment of detainees held in the custody of the United
States and the nature of interrogation tactics being used by United States forces
because "[m]uch of what [takes] place in the closed facilities where detainees

90. H.R. REP. No. 109-374, at 5-6.
91. Maggie Farley, U.S. Rejects Guantanamo Report, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006.

92. Id.
93. See id. (The five U.N. officials, called rapporteurs, have expertise in examining allegations
of arbitrary detention, torture and violations of human rights. The U.N. Human Rights
Commission appoints these officials for three-year terms.).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Farley, supra note 91.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id.
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[are] kept and interrogated remains secret."10 1 "In particular, the policies and
practices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are almost completely
shielded from public scrutiny."
In the last few years, decisions were made by
the Bush Administration to classify interrogation techniques, which were
previously accessible to the public. 1°3 Should these policies and interrogation
practices be kept secret? After all, "if the government is not engaging in
improper interrogation tactics, why won't it fully reveal its methods?"'
This
creates a dilemma between protecting the interests of national and operational
security and disclosing techniques employed by interrogators for public
comment and scrutiny. 1° 5 "The government's reluctance to release information
about the exact interrogation techni ues used on detainees is obviously rooted in
the need for operational security.
The biggest concern is that eventually,
after widespread dissemination of the precise methods and tactics employed by
American interrogators, al Qaeda or some other terrorist group could eventually
develop counter-intelligence techniques to thwart any attempts at gathering
information from one of its members held in United States custody. 10 7 Religious
extremists pose the biggest obstacle to effective interrogation.
There is
abundant evidence that many of these extremists perform a kind of self-hypnosis
during interrogations,10 9 with the most common resistance method being
memorization and continuous recital of the Qur' an during questioning. 110
The desire of government officials and military personnel to maintain
secrecy in interrogations is further supported by a nine-page sworn statement
from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which is commonly
referred to as the Jacoby Declaration.' 1 ' This Declaration was submitted to the
District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of the
government in Padilla v. Bush 112 by Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby (USN), the
Director of the DIA.113 The Declaration shed light not only on the government's
concern for maintaining secrecy in the interrogation process but also on the
government's fear that providing immediate access to counsel for suspects in the

101. PHR Report, supra note 6, at 2.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 15-16.
104. Addicott, supra note 8, at 878.
105. See id. at 877-79.
106. Id. at 878.
107. See id. at 877-79.
108. Bowden, supra note 1, at 64.
109. Id.
110. Thomas, supra note 36, at 31.
111. Jacoby Declaration, supra note 15, at 1.
112. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
113. See Jacoby Declaration, supra note 15, at 1.
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"War on Terror" will interrupt the gathering of useful intelligence. 114 Vice
Admiral Jacoby stated that "[o]ne of DIA's highest priorities is to collect
intelligence on terrorists, including al Qaida [sic] members, by interrogation and
other means." 115 The Vice Admiral then went on to explain that "the security of
this Nation and its citizens is dependent upon the United States government's
ability to gather ... [useful intelligence] and disseminate" it in a timely and
effective fashion to the public. 116 To that effect, one of the primary tools that the
United States has at its disposal when gathering intelligence and information is
interrogation, which Vice Admiral Jacoby defined as "the art of questioning and
examining a source to obtain the maximum amount of usable, reliable
117
information in the least amount of time to meet intelligence requirements."
Josd Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested in Chicago in 2002 due to both
his ties to the terrorist network of Al Qaeda and his implication in a plot to use a
radiological, or dirty, bomb in the United States. 118 In fact, the capture of Jos6
Padilla in 2002 was the direct result of effective intelligence gathering, which
would not have occurred without the interrogation of other detainees held in
United States custody, who knew of al Qaeda's plot to detonate a "dirty bomb"
within the United States. 119 In the case against him, Padilla v. Bush, 12 the
primary issue was the legality of whether an American citizen could be labeled
an "enemy combatant"
and detained in the United States without trial or access
12 1
attorney.
an
to

114. See id. at 1-9.

115. Id. at2.
116. Id. at 2.
117. Id. at 4.
118. See generally Jacoby Declaration, supra note 15, at 7 (discussing that, in 2002, Jose
Padilla-an American citizen-was arrested in Chicago and was "implicated in several plots to
carry out attacks against the United States, including the possible use of a "dirty" radiological
bomb in Washington DC or elsewhere, and the possible detonation of explosives in hotel rooms,
gas stations, and train stations." He is also alleged to have ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network
and Osama Bin Laden).
119. See id. at 5-8. At the time the declaration was written in 2002 "interrogations have been
conducted at many locations worldwide by personnel from the DIA and other organizations in the
Intelligence Community. The results of these interrogations have provided vital information to the
President... and others involved in the War on Terrorism It is estimated that more than 100
additional attacks on the United States and its interests have been thwarted since 11 September
2001 by the effective intelligence gathering efforts of the Intelligence Community and others." Id.
at 6.
120. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
121. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718 (2d Cir. 2003), remanded, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that, absent specific congressional authorization, the
President lacks inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain American
citizens on American soil outside a zone of combat.
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In addition to the collection of information, the purpose of detaining an
enemy combatant also serves to protect the United States from future acts of
violence by this specific detainee, ensuring that he does not immediately return
to resume fighting against the United States and its allies. 122 Vice Admiral
Jacoby also stressed that interrogation methods and detention practices must
maintain their secrecy because we are faced with a different kind of enemy in the
"War on Terror."' 2 3 Sophisticated terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, have
studied and learned many counterintelligence techniques employed by the
United States, including the creation of a training manual that "provides
instructions regarding, among other things: the collection of intelligence;
counter-interrogation techniques; and means of covert communication during
periods of capture."' 124 As information about the methods and tactics employed
by United States interrogators becomes widely accessible to the public, the
1 25
enemy's collective knowledge on how to counteract those methods increases.
What results, according to Vice Admiral Jacoby, is an "[i]mpairment of the
interrogation tool-especially with respect to enemy combatants associated with
al Qaida [sic]-[which] would undermine our Nation's intelligence gathering
efforts, thus jeopardizing the national security of the United States."' 12 6 As
evidence of this problem, some counselors and translators for "detainees at
Guantanamo Bay have been investigated for possible espionage" in the last few
years. 127
"The primary protection against torture or ill-treatment is the Torture
Convention which is effectively unenforceable by the international
community."' 128 One reason that countries can have some flexibility under the
Torture Convention and other international agreements is because these
conventions or treaties are essentially self-policing systems, with a great deal of
trust placed on each individual state actor to implement and ensure that its law
enforcement personnel and civil or military personnel comply with the
guidelines. 129 For example, "until about 1970, North Vietnam ignored its
[international] obligations not to mistreat" and torture the American POWs they
held in captivity. 130 North Vietnam's justification was that an unlawful war had
been declared against them; therefore, American POWs were not entitled to
122. Addicott, supra note 8, at 868-69.
123. Jacoby Declaration, supra note 15, at 6.
124. Id.
125. Id.

126. Id.
127. Addicott, supra note 8, at 879 (citing Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Fear of Sabotage by
Mistranslationat Guantanamo,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, at Al).

128. Id. at 873.
129. Torture Convention, supra note 4, at art. 10, para. 1.
130. McCain, supra note 51, at 34-35.
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international protections. 1 3 Article 10 of the Torture Convention states that
each state party shall "ensur[e] that education and information regarding the
prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement
personnel, civil or military,"' 132 as well as any "medical personnel, public
officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or
treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or
imprisonment."133

When there is "reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been
is
committee [sic] in any territory under its jurisdiction,"134 each state party 135
responsible for carrying out its own prompt and impartial investigation.
Additionally, an aggrieved party's redress is dependent on the State's
commitment to ensure that its legal system offers "the victim of an act of
torture ... [the] enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including
the means for as full rehabilitation as possible."' 36 The success of the Torture
Convention and its provisions are directly contingent on the willingness and the
which
commitment of the state actor to individually enforce those provisions,
137
community.,
international
the
by
unenforceable
"effectively
it
leaves
HI. THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE
Many of my comrades were subjected to very cruel, very inhumane and
degrading treatment, a few of them unto death. But every one of us...
knew and took great strengthfrom the belief that we were differentfrom
our enemies, that we were better than them, that we, if the roles were
reversed, would not disgrace ourselves by committing or approving such
mistreatment of them. 138
SenatorJohn McCain

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 35.
Torture Convention, supra note 4, at art. 10, para. 1.
Id.
Id. at art. 12.
135. Id.
136. Id. at art. 14, para. 1.
137. Addicott, supra note 8, at 873.
138. McCain, supra note 51, at 36. McCain goes on to state that he and his comrades "drew
[great] strength from their faith in each other, from their faith in God and from their faith in [their]
country.... That faith was indispensable not only to our survival, but to our attempts to return
home with honor. For without honor, our homecoming would have had little value to us." Id.
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A. The Backdrop of the McCain Amendment
Against the backdrop of continual skepticism regarding United States
interrogation techniques and constant complaints of prisoner abuse, Senator John
McCain was determined to do something because, as he said, "America's
position in the world is at an all-time low." 39 The McCain Amendment, which
is part of the 2006 Defense Appropriations Act, outlaws "cruel, inhuman or
degrading" interrogation techniques of all foreign prisoners, regardless of their
140
nationality or the physical location where they are being held in the world.
McCain's Amendment is written with a strong commitment to basic
humanitarian values. 14 1 He stresses that the war in which we are currently
engaged is a war of ideas and "[p]risoner abuses exact a terrible toll on us in this
war of ideas." 14 2 "They inevitably become public, and when they do they
threaten our moral standing, and expose us to false but widely disseminated
charges that democracies are no more inherently idealistic and moral than...
[terrorist] regimes."' 14 3 When United States troops mistreat enemy prisoners,
they endanger themselves if they are someday held captive by that enemy.144
McCain focuses on the fact that, although Al Qaeda is far from a conventional
enemy and disregards any notion of the principle of reciprocity, "we should not
undermine today our defense of international prohibitions against torture and
145
inhumane treatment of [detainees] that we will need to rely on in the future."'
"It is far better to embrace a standard that might be violated in extraordinary
circumstances 14 6than to lower our standards to accommodate a remote
contingency.'
Prior to the McCain Amendment, a gray area existed with regard to the
United States treatment of detainees housed in foreign countries around the
world because "the vast majority of ...detainees are aliens located outside the
United States,"' 14 7 and therefore they were not entitled to the Constitutional
protections under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 148 Since these
detainees were not entitled to these Constitutional protections due to the physical
location of their detention, their primary protection against torture or illtreatment was the Torture Convention, which as stated previously, is "effectively

139.
140.
141.
142.

Thomas, supra note 36, at 32.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003(d), 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
McCain, supra note 51, at 34-35.
Id. at 35.

143. Id.
144. Id. at 34.

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Addicott, supra note 8, at 873.
Id.
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unenforceable by the international community."' 149 The McCain Amendment is
an attempt to clarify this gray area and ensure that detainees held by United
States military personnel, regardless of physical location, are150not subject to
torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Additionally, the McCain Amendment is an attempt to provide assurances
to individuals subjected to rendition, that they will not face torture or illtreatment in the country to where they are being transferred. 15 1 "Rendition is a
term used in the international law enforcement community for the transfer of
suspects from one country to another."' 152 "According to press reports, the
President has expanded the CIA's authority to conduct renditions, and some
' 153
reports suggest that over 100 terrorism related renditions have occurred."
"These renditions of terrorist suspects have been surrounded by allegations of
abuse by the receiving country, confusion as to what type of assurances
regarding treatment have been obtained by the U.S. and allegations that the
rendition occurred without the consent of the country from which the suspect
was transferred."' 154 Transferring a person to another country where they may be
subjected to torture or other cruel treatment is in clear violation of the Torture
Convention. 155 Article 3 of the Torture Convention states that no country "shall
expel... or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that [person] would be in danger of being subjected to
torture. ' ' 156 Under Article 3, before someone is transferred to another state, the
transferring country must take into consideration whether the receiving country
has shown
a "consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human
57
rights."'

1

The Administration's official position is that renditions have occurred, but
people are not being transferred to countries where it is believed they will be
tortured. 158 Still, as late as February 2006, there have been reports of individuals
being transferred to countries where they are being subjected to torture. 159 For
example, "an Egyptian-born Australian in American custody, was allegedly

149. Id.
150. See generally Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739

(2005).
151. See Detainee Treatment Act § 1003 (a).
152. H.R. REp. No. 109-374, at 6 (2006).
153. H.R. REp. No. 109-374, at 6.
154. H.R. REP. No. 109-374, at 6.
155. See generally Torture Convention, supra note 4, at art. 3.
156. Id. at art. 3, para. 1.
157. Id. at art. 3, para. 2.
158. H.R. REP. No. 109-374, at 6-7.
159. H.R. REP. No. 109-374, at 6-7.
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transported from Pakistan to Afghanistan to Egypt to Guantanamo Bay." 160 He
alleges that, while being held in Egypt, he was subjected to beatings and electric
shocks for six months.' 6 1 With the introduction of the McCain Amendment,
afforded to
instances such as this would be forbidden and the protections
162
out.
spelled
clearly
be
would
renditions
to
subject
individuals
As stated earlier, the McCain Amendment's specific focus is on preventing
the "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" of any individual
regardless of their physical location. 163 The protection extends to any
"individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States
Government, regardless of nationality or physical location."164To amplify the
point, specific language inserted under the Construction subsection of section
1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act states, "nothing in this section shall be
construed to impose any geographical limitation on the applicability of the
prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment." 1 National security
advisor, Stephen J. Hadley, described the Amendment as making the ban on
torture and other forms of cruel or degrading treatment "a matter of law that
applies worldwide, at home and abroad."1 6 Additionally, the Amendment
clarifies the term "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" to
mean the "cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by
the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments," as well as the definition under
the Torture Convention. 167 The Amendment seeks to ensure compliance by
specifically stating that "no person under the effective control of the Department
of Defense ...shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not
authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence

160. H.R. REP. No. 109-374, at 6.

161. H.R. REP. No. 109-374, at 6. Additionally, the House Report details two other cases. The
first one deals with "[a] dual Canadian-Syrian citizen . .. [who] was allegedly rendered to Syria,
where he was allegedly tortured and interrogated for suspected terrorist activities with the
acquiescence of the United States." The second case deals with "U.S. intelligence operatives
allegedly seiz[ing] in Italy and render[ing] to Egypt an Islamic cleric, allegedly without the consent
of the Italian Government." See id.
162. See generally Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739
(2005).
163. Detainee Treatment Act § 1003 (a).
164. Detainee Treatment Act § 1003 (a) (emphasis added).
165. Detainee Treatment Act § 1003 (b) (emphasis added).
166. Editorial, Unchecked Abuse, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2006, at A20, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01 /10/AR2006011001536_pf.html

(last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
167. Detainee Treatment Act § 1003 (d).

174

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 14:1

Interrogation.' ' 168 According to Senator McCain, full compliance
under the
169
Army Field Manual would "still give interrogators some leeway."'
B. Compliance Under the United States Army Field Manual

The United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation defines
interrogation as the "process of examining a source" 170 which allows the
interrogator "to obtain the maximum amount of usable information."]17 1 Such
information has to be obtained "in a lawful manner, [and] in a minimum amount
of time." 172 The information produced during an interrogation must be timely,
complete, clear, and accurate in order for the interrogation to be considered a
success. 17 3 Furthermore, the Army Field Manual states that the interrogator "has
a position of authority over the source," who upon realizing this position will
' 174
"believe[] his future might depend upon his association with the interrogator.
With respect to torture and use of force, the Army Field Manual is very specific
in its prohibition against such acts. 175 The official language in the manual states
that the "US policy expressly prohibit[s] acts of violence or intimidation,
including physical or mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to inhumane
treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation."' 176 The Manual goes on to
describe the use of force as a poor technique that "yields unreliable results, may
damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever
he thinks the interrogator wants to hear."' 17 7 Although the acts described above
are prohibited, they should "not be confused with psychological ploys, 'verbal
178
trickery, or other nonviolent or noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator."

168. Detainee Treatment Act § 1002 (a).
169. Thomas, supra note 36, at 32.
170. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION (1992), at
1-6,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf#search=%22FM%203452%2OField%20Manual%22 (last visited Nov. 15, 2006), [hereinafter "Army Field Manual"] (The
U.S. Department Army Field Manual never once uses the words "prisoner," "insurgent," etc.
Instead, the Field Manual continually uses the word "source" when discussing authorized
interrogation techniques.).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1-6 to 1-7.
173. Id. at 1-7.
174. Id. at 1-14.
175. See generally id. at 1-7 to 1-9.
176. Army Field Manual, supra note 170, at 1-8.
177. Id. The Army Field Manual adds that the use of force is not only a poor technique but also
that "experience indicates that the use of [force on detainees] is not necessary to gain the
cooperation of' the source. Id.
178. Id. Additionally, the Army Field Manual states that "[t]he psychological techniques and
principles ... should neither be confused with.., unauthorized techniques such as
brainwashing ... mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs." Id.
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With respect to the authorized approaches used by interrogators to get
information, the Army Field Manual provides an exhaustive list of different
approach techniques. 9 A majority of these approaches center on psychological
Almost all
techniques designed to exploit the mental fragility of the source.
of these techniques involve nothing that is physically demanding, threatening, or
coercive by the interrogator; rather, they incorporate some sort of trickery or
mind-game. 181 For instance, a technique such as the "We Know All" Approach
is intended to convince the source that the Unites States military forces already
know everything, thus making resistance useless. 182 The interrogator prepares
all known information about the source, and after convincing the source that he
interjects183questions for which the
to say which is unknown,
or she has nothing
•
•
Another illustration is
interrogator does not have the corresponding answers.
the "Rapid Fire" Approach, which involves a "psychological ploy based upon
the principles that [e]veryone likes to be heard when he speaks [and that] [i]t is
confusing to be interrupted in midsentence with an unrelated question." 184 This
technique authorizes the interrogator to ask a series of unrelated questions in
such a way that the source does not have enough time to answer one question
before the next question is asked. 185 The intended result of this approach is to
"confuse[] the source, [because] he will tend to contradict himself, as he has
' 186
little time to [prepare] his answers."
While all of the techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual are in
clear compliance with the international prohibitions against torture and
inhumane treatment by upholding the United States commitment to humanitarian
values, one is left questioning the effectiveness of some of the techniques in
practice, particularly with the kind of enemy that the United States faces
For example, the "Emotional Love Approach" instructs the
today. 18
interrogator to "focus on the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstances
in which he finds himself... [and] direct the love the source feels toward the
A successful
appropriate object: family, homeland, or comrades." ' 188
interrogator might effectively exploit the source by explaining to the source that
providing information may bring "a quicker end to the war [and] save his

179. See generally id. at 3-13 to 3-20.
180. See generally id.
181. See generally id.

182. Army Field Manual, supra note 170, at 3-19.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 3-20.

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 3-13 to 3-20.

188. Army Field Manual, supra note 170, at 3-15.
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190
comrades' lives,"' 89 and that failing to do so could result in their deaths.
Another authorized approach is the "Silence" Approach, which can be used on
sources that appear nervous or confident. 19 1 The Field Manual instructs the
interrogator that "[w]hen employing this technique, the interrogator says nothing
to the source, but looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight smile on
not to look away from the source but force him to
his face."' 19 2 "It is important
' 193
first."
contact
break eye
In the current context of the "War on Terror," how practically effective
could these techniques really be? As stated in the Army Field Manual, the goal
194
of the interrogation is to obtain usable information in the least amount of time.
Under the "Emotional Love Approach," explained above, does an Islamic
extremist, who is willing to commit suicide for his cause, have any interest in
bringing "a quicker end to the war to save his comrades' lives" on the battlefield,
which would prompt him to provide information to interrogators? 195 After all,
the United States is currently dealing with an unconventional enemy dedicated to
the intentional destruction of innocent lives. 196 Senator John McCain has
referred to al Qaeda as sociopaths that "will never be influenced by international
sensibilities or open to moral suasion." 197 It is thus hard to imagine that any of
Islamic extremists willing to end their
these techniques will have any effect on 198
lives.
innocent
of
destruction
the
lives for
Problems associated with many of the approaches authorized by the Army
Field Manual include the fact that some techniques require time-consuming
preparation, while others risk that the source might eventually realize the trickery
to cooperate. 19 9 The success of terrorism is imbedded in
involved and refuse
.
200"T
"To counter an enemy who relies on stealth and surprise,
stealth and surprise.
the most valuable tool is information ... ,,201 However, that information is only
valuable if timely received by interrogators. 202 Interrogation techniques that fail

189. Id.
190. See generally id.

191. Id. at 3-20.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Army Field Manual, supra note 170, at 1-6 to 1.7.
195. Id. at 3-15.

196. McCain, supra note 51, at 35.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See generally Army Field Manual, supra note 170, at 3-13 to 3-20.
200. Bowden, supra note 1, at 53.
201. Id.
202. See Army Field Manual, supra note 170, at 1-6 to 1-7.
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to provide timely information are useless in the "War on Terror." 20 3 For
example, the "We Know All" Approach requires the interrogator to convince the
source that the United States already knows everything the latter may have to
offer. 204 In order for this approach to be effective, the interrogator must
organize, prepare, and commit to memory all available data on the source before
the interrogation begins. 205 This is a very time consuming process and an
it may
interrogator does not have the luxury of working from notes because
20 6
show the source the limits of the information that is actually known.
Another approach authorized by the Army Field Manual, which, as McCain
has said, would still give interrogators some leeway, is the "Fear-Up (Harsh)"
Approach. 207 This approach allows the interrogator to "behave[] in an
overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice."' 20 8 "The interrogator
may even feel the need to throw objects across the room to heighten the source's
implanted feelings of fear.' ' 209 However, this approach expressly warns the
interrogator to take great care in ensuring that no violation of the Geneva
Conventions against torture or ill-treatment is taking place. 2 1 The central focus
and create the feeling that the
of this approach is to instill fear in the source,
21
cooperate.
to
but
option
other
no
source has
C. The Use of Fearand Other "Aggressive" Techniques in Interrogation
The use of fear and coercion in interrogation has been a source of
considerable debate for many years, although explicitly forbidden under the
McCain Amendment and the Army Field Manual. 2 12 The use of fear, primarily
in the form of mock executions, such as waterboarding or exposure to extreme
pain, have been supported by some and renounced by others. Waterboarding has
received considerable press coverage, and involves the use of a technique "where
a prisoner is restrained and blindfolded while an interrogator pours water on his
face and into his mouth-causing the prisoner to believe he is being
2
'
drowned.... [while in fact] there is no intention to injure him physically."

203. This author posits that one could hardly argue that an interrogator or an interrogation
system producing information about the September 11th attacks on September 13th represents an
inefficient and useless endeavor. See id.
204. Army Field Manual, supra note 170, at 3-19.
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 3-16.
208. Id.

209. Id.
210. Army Field Manual, supra note 170, at 3-16.
211. See id.

212. See Bowden, supra note 1, at 58-60.
213. McCain, supra note 51, at 36.
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Many government officials, including Senator John McCain, have publicly
renounced the use of waterboarding and other mock executions during
interrogations. 2 14 McCain feels that waterboarding does constitute torture and
has said:
[I]f you gave people who have suffered abuse as prisoners a
choice between a beating and a mock execution, many, including
me, would choose a beating. The effects of most beatings heal.
The memory of an execution will haunt someone for a very long
time and damage his or her psyche in ways that may never heal.
In my view, to make someone believe that you are killing him by
drowning is no different than holding a pistol to his head and
2 15
firing a blank. I believe that it is torture, very exquisite torture.
However, the Administration and many of its lawyers have taken the
position that the McCain Amendment would not necessarily forbid this
technique, much less consider it to be torture. 2 16 Although it is hard to imagine
someone arguing that using this technique is not cruel or degrading, the Justice
Department ..
has reasoned
this technique falls just short of torture and would
.
.that.217
still be permitted in certain circumstances.
The Administration's reluctance to
label.,-this technique
outright
torture
is
likely
tied to the technique's proven
21821
2 19
effectiveness.
Mark Kirk,
a reserve Naval Intelligence officer who has
personally been subjected to the technique, told a reporter in December of 2005
that "everyone breaks when waterboarded, usually in less than a minute, and that
U.S. combat troops, pilots and others who might be captured routinely undergo
the procedure as part of their training. ' 2 2° Additionally, CIA officers reported
that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the September 1lth mastermind, was
subjected to "waterboarding" and "held out for two and a half minutes before
begging to talk. ' 22 1 KSM is regarded as the highest-ranking al Qaeda operative
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captured, as well as the provider of valuable information in the "War on
Terror. ' 222 Clearly, the use of such technique would only be utilized on the
highest value targets captured by the United States, such as another high-level
operative like KSM; however, the debate continues as to whether the Bush
Administration will consider
waterboarding to be torture and forbid its use as an
223
interrogation technique.
Others support the notion that creating an atmosphere of profound fear is an
effective technique. 224 One retired Special Forces officer even suggested that
"to make a man talk... [yjou shoot the man to his left and the man to his right[,
t]hen you can't shut him up." 225 But it is the fear of having to endure intense
pain, rather than the actual pain itself, that has had significant results. 226 "[M]ost
people cope with pain better than they think they will.'227 Once "people
become... familiar with pain, they become conditioned to it."' 228 The best
illustration of this comes from the accounts of Bill Cowan, who spent three and a
half years in Vietnam fighting in a highly volatile region located in the south of
Saigon, where Vietcong battalions would launch surprise attacks from the
muddy swamps of the area.229 Cowan's unit "captured a Vietcong soldier who
could warn of ambushes and lead them" to any troops hiding nearby. 23 When
the captured Vietcong soldier "refused to speak, wires were attached to [his]
scrotum with alligator clips and electricity was cranked out of a 10-volt
generator. ' 23 1 Cowan reported, "It worked like a charm... [t]he minute the
crank started to turn, [the Vietcong soldier] was ready to talk. We never had to
do more than make it clear we could deliver a jolt. It was the fear more than the
2 32
pain that made [him] talk."
However, outright threats of execution to a prisoner often prove fruitless in
the end "because the sense of despair it induces can make the prisoner withdraw
into depression-or, in some cases, see an honorable way out of [the]
predicament."' 233 It is the fear of the unknown 2or
34 the fear of intense pain or
execution, which has produced significant results.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See generally Kondracke, supra note 216; see also Bowden, supra note 1, at 51-53.
See Kondracke, supra note 216.
Bowden, supra note 1, at 58-60.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 58-60.
Bowden, supra note 1, at 58.
Id at 60.
Id.
Id.
See id., at 58-60.

[Vol. 14:1

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

This ongoing debate comes at a time when some people, who have no
objection to the use of coercive and aggressive interrogation techniques on highvalue targets, have questioned whether the United States' interrogation tactics
are forceful enough to make a difference in the "War on Terror."' 235 These
people believe that current United States interrogation tactics amount to nothing
more than "handling terrorists with kid gloves."
One former CIA agent, with
experience in South America, echoes that sentiment by stating "[e]verybody in
the world knows237that if you are arrested by the United States, nothing bad will
happen to you."
To illustrate this point, on March 27, 2006, Zacarias Moussaoui testified in
his defense, against the advice from his attorneys, "at the federal [sentencing]
trial that will determine if he serves the rest of his life in prison or [receives] the
death penalty" for his role in the September 11 th attacks. 238 Moussaoui has long
been referred to as the 20th hijacker of the September 11 th attacks and would
have actively pursued martyrdom that day with the other terrorists, but for his
arrest in August of 2001. 2 3 Moussaoui's testimony was a disturbing look into
240
the mind of the enemy the United States now faces in the "War on Terror."
Moussaoui admitted that he was the 20th hijacker and his intended mission was
to hijack an airplane and crash it into the White House. 24 1 But it was his
testimony regarding another subject that could present a strong argument for
greater flexibility within interrogations of suspected terrorists.
Moussaoui
testified that he lied to investigators after his arrest regarding his involvement
with al Qaeda and continued to lie because he wanted the September 11th plan to
go forward. 243 The government has argued that the attacks 244
may have been
thwarted had Moussaoui been more cooperative with authorities.
Part of the problem in the Moussaoui case was the failure of the FBI
intelligence community to timely investigate clear warning signs regarding
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Moussaoui's possible terrorist intentions. 24 5 Harry Samit, the FBI agent
responsible for arresting Moussaoui in Minneapolis, has maintained since
August 2001 that he repeatedly warned his superiors in the FBI "that Moussaoui
might be a terrorist interested in hijacking an airliner." 2 46 The question remains
whether a more diligent investigation coupled with more aggressive
interrogation techniques could have provided United States intelligence
247
personnel with enough information to thwart the September 11 th attacks.
After all, there were clear warning signs discovered during Samit's investigation
of Moussaoui that should have raised a red flag regarding his intentions in this
country. 248 Moussaoui was taking flight training in Norman, Oklahoma, and had
expressed an
need
to advance his flight training to include flying
• ,• ,.urgent 249
•
commercial airliners. 29Moussaoui was a radical Islamic extremist who, by all
accounts including the deposition provided by his former roommate in Norman,
obsessively talked everyday about the holy war. 25 Perhaps these warning signs
could have justified using more aggressive interrogation techniques on
Moussaoui after his arrest, instead of
simply relying on Moussaoui to cooperate
25 1
investigation.
the
in
with authorities
D. The PresidentialSigning Statement
Many government officials criticized the Bush Administration's attempts to
block the adoption of the McCain Amendment in late 2005. 252 One senator
stated that "the administration only accepted it in the face of overwhelming
congressional support and in the wake of international condemnation resulting
from allegations" of United States torture and ill-treatment. 2 53 Shortly after
signing the Defense Appropriations Bill into law in early 2006, which included
the McCain Amendment, President Bush issued a signing statement, which
added to the criticism. 254 A signing statement is "an official position by the
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President that pronounces his interpretation of a new law.'255 Bush's signing
statement was a declaration that he views the McCain Amendment "to be limited
authority' as commander-in-chief to protect the national security
by his 'inherent
256
of America."
The language used by the President's lawyers asserts that "his powers allow
him, in wartime, to ignore statutes passed by Congress. ' 257 David Golove, a law
professor at New York University School of Law, stated:
The signing statement is saying 'I will only comply with this law
when I want to, and if something arises in the war on terrorism
where I think it's important to torture or engage in cruel,
inhuman, and degrading conduct, I have the
authority to do so
258
me.'
stop
to
going
is
law
this
in
nothing
and
This signing statement gave the President "the same power that the McCain
Amendment sought to prevent," which seems to be a recurring practice within
the Bush Administration. 2 59 Circumventing the other branches of government
and neglecting the idea of separation of powers leaves the President with "the
ultimate power to execute and interpret the law." 260 Although many
administration officials have maintained that the President would only ignore the
law in an emergency situation, many in Congress fear that the Bush
Administration is exponentially expanding the power of the President. 2 6 1 For
instance, "in a congressional hearing, US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
suggested that the President could invoke his authority as commander-in-chief 262
to
conclude that a law was unconstitutional and refuse to comply with it."
However, the power to declare laws 26
unconstitutional,
under our Constitution, is a
3
judiciary.
the
in
solely
power vested
In fact, two strongly debated topics throughout the Judiciary Committee
testimony of Justice Samuel Alito were the issue of presidential signing
statements and the scope of executive power. 264 "In a 1986 memorandum, Alito
argued that the President should issue statements when signing a bill because the
President's 'understanding of the bill should be just as important as that of
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
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Congress. ' ' 265 One senator expressed his concern that "[tihe practice Judge
Alito first advocated in the mid-1980s arguably helps the executive to thwart the
will of Congress when it passes a law."26 6 The current Supreme Court has given
these signing statements, such as the one issued by President Bush regarding the
McCain Amendment, no weight when they are interpreting the meanings of acts
of Congress. 267 However, there is some trepidation amongst many in Congress
regarding Justice Alito's views on Presidential 26signing statements, "should they
[ever] come before him on the Supreme Court."
IV. THE ONGOING DILEMMA: THE "TICKING TIME BOMB" SCENARIO

Getting at the information [terrorists]possess could allow us to thwart
major attacks, unravel their organizations, and save thousands of lives.
They and their situation pose
one of the strongest arguments in modern
269
times for the use of torture.
Mark Bowden
The McCain Amendment was written against the backdrop of damaging
allegations against the United States. 27 These allegations not only hurt the
United States' reputation as a nation but also discredited its efforts to promote
democracy and human rights in the Muslim world. 27 1 The McCain Amendment
was a direct attempt to clarify the United States' official policy regarding the
treatment of detainees. 272 Many in Congress were quick to support this
Amendment because, as Senator Feingold stated, "it should help bring back
some accountability to the process and restore our
great Nation's reputation as
,,273mth
the world's leading advocate for human rights.
However, aside from the
issue of the presidential signing statement, the McCain Amendment still leaves
some questions unanswered-specifically what can interrogators do when
confronted with a ticking time bomb scenario? Such scenario involves the threat
2 74
of an imminent terrorist attack on the United States or its interests abroad.
For instance, the scenario would develop when a terrorist is taken into custody
265.
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267.
268.
269.
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by United States officials who have sound reasons to believe that the terrorist
knows and possesses specific knowledge of an imminent terrorist attack, such as
a plot similar to September 11 th, a bomb placed on a New York City subway,
etc. 275 In this instance, an interrogator would be faced with a major dilemma:
comply with the McCain Amendment or resort to more extreme measures and
methods to extract276 useful information that could stop the attack and save
thousands of lives.
Courts in the United States have developed a "shock[] the conscience"
standard in domestic cases for determining whether police conduct amounts to
Since the McCain Amendment has
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
been described by national security advisor Stephen J. Hadley and other public
officials as making the ban on torture and other forms of cruel or degrading
treatment a "matter of law that applies worldwide, at home and abroad,"'278 the
"shock the conscience" standard would presumably apply in interrogation
settings within the 2"War
on Terror," regardless of where the interrogations took
79
place in the world.
The "shock the conscience" standard was originally developed in the 1952
Supreme Court case Rochin v. California, and was recently left in place in the
2003 Supreme Court decision in Chavez v. Martinez.28 In Rochin, three deputy
sheriffs had information that Rochin was selling narcotics. 28 1 After entering the
outside open door of Rochin's two-story dwelling and forcing open the door to
Rochin's bedroom, the officers found Rochin sitting on the side of the bed along
with two capsules on a nearby nightstand. 282 When questioned about the
capsules' owner, Rochin seized them and swallowed them. 283 The sheriffs then
handcuffed Rochin and took him to a hospital where, at their direction, "a doctor
forced an emetic solution through a tube into Rochin's stomach against his
will."' 284

The solution caused Rochin to vomit the two capsules, which were

later found to be morphine, and he was subsequently convicted. 285 "The
Supreme Court overturned the conviction and held that obtaining evidence by
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methods that are 'so brutal and so offensive to human dignity' violate the
Fourteen Amendment's Due Process Clause." 28 6 The Court explained:
[W]e are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which
this conviction was obtained do more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks
the conscience.... this course of proceeding by agents of
government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities. They are methods too close
to the rack and screw to
287
differentiation.
constitutional
of
permit
The Court stressed that it will not condone this type of police conduct in
discovering
evidence because to do so "would be to afford brutality the cloak of
288
law.",
Since the "shocks the conscience" standard is a subjective standard, it
would allow for a sliding scale determination by the court.
For example, it
would not perhaps shock the conscience of the court if some high value targets
were roughed up to gather information that would avert an attack on a United
States city; however, under this standard, the humiliation of detainees at Abu
Ghraib would clearly be off limits. 290 In defending the controversial presidential
signing statement regarding the McCain Amendment, administration officials
stressed that the President would only bypass the law in emergencies, like a
ticking time bomb situation. 29 Even McCain has acknowledged that some rare
instances may call for the torture or ill-treatment of a suspect in order to prevent
292
an imminent attack on our country or divert a threat to our national security.
According to Senator McCain, "[y]ou do what you have to do, [b]ut you take
responsibility for it." 293 "Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas corpus in the Civil
War, and FDR violated the Neutrality Acts before World War 11."294 Senator
McCain did not write an exemption into the amendment to account for the
ticking time bomb scenario due to the fear that carving out legal exemptions to
the protection of human rights leaves the door open for systematic abuse as a
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matter of course and results in the exception swallowing the rule. 295 Senator
McCain has also stated that "[i]t is far better to embrace a standard that might be
violated in extraordinary circumstances than to lower our standards to
accommodate a remote contingency, confusing personnel in the field and
sending precisely the wrong message abroad about America's purposes and
practices."296

McCain argues that if a United States interrogator does resort to extreme
measures to extract information from a suspect and if it does result in the
prevention of another September 1lth attack, the public and authorities would
take that into account when judging the interrogator and the dire situation which
he or she confronted. 297 However, this argument presupposes that the
interrogator, the court, and the public have a clear understanding of just how
deadly the prevented attack was without the attack ever happening. This author
posits that no member of the United States' intelligence community or general
public could have possibly imagined how organized, elaborate, and destructive
the September 11th hijackers' plan was going to be on September 10, 2001. The
seriousness of this attack did not become apparent until it played out in front of
our eyes and was burned in our collective memories forever. A suspect arrested
on September 10, 2001 and tortured by United States interrogators could have
provided the United States with enough information to stop the attacks from
taking place. Would the interrogator's conduct have "shocked the conscience"
even though the seriousness of the threat thwarted would be unclear?
The morality of torturing someone in extreme and urgent circumstances is
easy to define
on a large, broad
scale, but breaks down dramatically in applying
t
298
it to particular circumstances.
Obviously, the United States has an interest in
upholding and protecting the human rights of every individual that we hold in
Civil people everywhere can agree that torturing someone is evil and
custody.
indefensible.30 0 However, the prevention of another large-scale terrorist attack
and the protection of innocent lives in the United States and abroad could lead
someone to argue that torture is justified in particular circumstances. 30 1 When
asked whether he would favor waterboarding or another aggressive interrogation
technique to extract information from a high value terrorist regarding terrorist
networks or future planned attacks, one reporter stated that "[he] would [favor
waterboarding] in a New York minute - that is, in memory of those who died at
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the World Trade Center and to protect those who might be saved by preventing
the next Sept. 11., 302
The strongest argument for the use of torture or other aggressive
interrogation techniques when faced with a ticking time bomb situation can be
illustrated by the story of Jakob von Metzler. 30 3 On September 27, 2003, in
Frankfurt, Germany,04 a law student kidnapped an eleven-year-old boy named
Jakob von Metzler.3
The kidnapper had covered Jakob's mouth and nose with duct
tape, wrapped the boy in plastic, and hidden him in a wooded
area near a lake. The police captured the suspect when he tried
to pick up ransom money, but the suspect wouldn't reveal where
he had left the boy, who the police thought might still be alive.
So the deputy police chief of Frankfurt, Wolfgang Daschner, told
his subordinates to threaten the suspect with torture. According
to the suspect, he was told that a 'specialist' was being flown in
who would 'inflict pain on me of the sort I had never
experienced.' The suspect promptly told 30
the
police where he'd
5
hidden Jakob, who, sadly, was found dead.
The police chief immediately faced criticism for threatening the use of
torture from many civil rights groups dedicated to combating torture wherever it
exists in the world, including Amnesty International. 30 6 When asked whether it
was wrong for the police chief in the Jakob von Metzler case to threaten the use
of torture under the circumstances, the director of government relations for
Amnesty International stated that "[w]e recognize that there are difficult
situations ... [b]ut we are opposed to torture under any and all circumstances,
30 7
and threatening torture is inflicting mental pain."
Author Mark Bowden describes the clashing moralities on this sensitive
30 8
subject to the differences between the warrior and the civilian sensibilities.
The civilian sensibility, adopted by many civil rights groups, sees abusive
government power as a greater threat to society. 30 9 No matter what "the
difficulties posed by a particular situation, such as trying to find... Jakob von
Metzler before he suffocated .... Allowing an exception in one case... would
302. Kondracke, supra note 216.
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304. Id.
305. Id.

306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.

309. Bowden, supra note 1, at 70.

188

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 14:1

open the door" for greater governmental abuses in the future. 3 10 The civilian
sensibility values, above anything else, the rule of law and strict adherence to
it.3 11 The primary fear within this community is that "[i]f the end justifies the
means, then where would you draw the line?" 312
The warrior sensibility, on the other hand, is more focused on what needs to
be done to complete a mission. 3 13 Bowden stresses the fact that "[b]y definition,
war exists because civil means have failed." 314 This sensibility strictly focuses
3 15
on winning the war and preserving the lives of those you are sworn to protect.
To the warrior sensibility, the uncooperative enemy's dignity or civil rights
weigh little in comparison to the lives of his own men. 316 Bill Cowan, the
interrogator who described using alligator clips on a subject in Vietnam,
described the situation as:
It isn't about getting mad, or payback .... It's strictly business.
Torturing people doesn't fit my moral compass at all. But I don't
think there's much of a gray area. Either the guy has information
you need or not. Either
it's vital or it's not. You know which
3 17
guys you need to twist.
V. CONCLUSION

If interrogatorsstep over the line from coercion to outright torture, they
should be held personally responsible. But no interrogatoris ever going
to be prosecutedfor keeping Khalid Sheik Mohammed [or any other high
value8 target] awake, cold, alone, and uncomfortable. Nor should he
3
be. 1
Mark Bowden
The "War on Terror" is changing the balance between civil liberties and
national security demands. 3 19 Never before in our nation's history have we
faced an enemy with such a strong dedication to the destruction of western
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civilization, specifically American lives. 32 Terrorist organizations, such as Al
Qaeda, will "never be influenced by international sensibilities or open to moral
suasion." 32 1 They are groups of radical Islamic extremists whose sense of
morality is fundamentally opposed to our way of life, and they will justify any
method of destroying it. 322 The pre-September 1lth environment in which we
lived in will never return and the threat of terrorism remains fixed in our
everyday lives. 323 One thing is certain: if the United States is to be successful 324
in
the "War on Terror," interrogation will be the centerpiece in doing so.
Interrogation techniques that provide timely and accurate information to the
United States Intelligence Community are essential in stopping potential terrorist
attacks and breaking up terror cells around the world. Torture is an illegal crime
against humanity that is abhorred by civilized people everywhere, and it should
continue to be readily condemned. 325 The introduction of the McCain
Amendment is a key tool in ensuring that the United States restores 3"our
great
26
Nation's reputation as the world's leading advocate for human rights."
However, with the new enemy that we face, it is important that we
recognize that an emergency ticking time bomb situation may present itself,
which could justify the use of interrogation techniques that could be seen as
coercive or aggressive in order to save lives. The solution to this problem, as
long as torture is illegal, is for an interrogator to use his or her best judgment
under the circumstances, and accept the risk. 327 The interrogator must be willing
to accept the fact that he broke the law in order to avert a possible terrorist attack
that could have cost thousands of lives and be judged by the "shock[] the
conscience" standard in court. In most instances, the chance that the interrogator
32 8
in a legitimate ticking time bomb situation would be prosecuted is very small.
To date, "Wolfgang Daschner, the Frankfurt deputy police chief, has not been
prosecuted for threatening to torture Jakob von Metzler's kidnapper, even though
he clearly broke the law." 329 In recognizing this threat, the use of the word
"never" with regard to coercive or aggressive interrogation techniques should be
accepted with a touch of hypocrisy.
It is imperative to recognize that these
techniques "should be banned but also quietly practiced" in situations that
320.
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threaten our national security. 33 1 As the late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
once wrote:
In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a
proper balance between freedom and order. In wartime, reason
and history both suggest that this balance shifts to some degree
in favor of order-in favor of the government's ability to deal
332
with conditions that threaten the national well-being.
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